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 EMV (Europay, Mastercard, Visa) is a standard for credit card and debit card payments 
2
 3D Secure implementations Verified by Visa
TM
, MasterCard SecureCode
TM 
and American Express SafeKey
TM
. 
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This paper describes a potential attack on EMV
1
 contactless payment cards which is low cost, high 
return and relatively easy to implement.  This could have a serious impact on the security of EMV 
cards because it requires little investment or expertise to carry out successful card fraud, leading 
to more attacks being attempted.  3D Secure
2
 payment authentication addresses the issue, but will 
only resolve it once all websites are protected by 3D Secure.  This paper proposes a low cost 
solution to address the vulnerability, in which contactless payments cards would only be active 
when the cardholder wants to make a payment. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The intention of this paper is to highlight a potential 
vulnerability in the new contactless payments system 
and to propose a workable / low cost solution that 
addresses the issue. 
The most disturbing feature of the attack described in 
this paper is that it is low tech, low cost and relatively 
easy to implement.  The simplicity of the attack is what 
makes it both accessible and attractive to criminals. 
2.  RELATED WORK 
Research [2][3][4] into the vulnerabilities of the EMV 
payments system show that it is relatively difficult to 
attack the contact chip on EMV cards.  The 
vulnerabilities identified require sophisticated 
modifications to be made to Chip and PIN terminal [4] or 
the creation of sophisticated bespoke electronics [2] [3]. 
The introduction of NFC payments to the EMV system 
opens new avenues of attack that do not require physical 
contact with the card and can be implemented using off-
the-shelf technology, making possible relatively simple 
attacks such as the one identified in this paper. 
3.  UK CARD FRAUD 
Since the UK introduction of EMV Chip & PIN payments 
technology in 2004 the incidence of card fraud has 
steadily risen, however it remains relatively low when 
viewed as proportion of the rapidly increasing number 
(and value) of card transactions [1]. 
3.1  Changing Profile of Card Fraud 
The security features built in to EMV may not have 
eradicated card fraud but they have forced significant 
changes in the types of card fraud being committed. 
The card fraud statistics [1] show a reduction in simple 
over the counter card fraud, where criminals attempt to 
use lost, stolen or cloned cards in retail shops (down 
67% between 2004 and 2009).  At the same time there 
has been an increase in more sophisticated forms of 
card fraud, such as card-not-present fraud (up 77%) and 
UK cards which have been cloned for use in overseas 
transactions (up 33%). 
 
Category of Fraud 2004  2009 Chg 
Overseas Transactions £92.5m £122.7m 33% 
Card Not Present £150.8m £266.4m 77% 
Over the Counter £218.8m £72.1m -67% 
Counterfeit / Cloned 
Cards used in the UK £129.7m £80.9m -38% 
Lost & Stolen Cards £114.4m £47.9m -58% 
Identity Theft £36.9m £38.2m 4% 
Card Not Received in 
the Mail £72.9m £6.9m -91% 
Table 1: UK Card Fraud by Category source FFA [1] 
3.2  Criminal Sophistication 
Proof of the current level of sophistication of criminal 
gangs can be seen in news reports of card fraud attacks 
in the UK [5] criminals posing as repair engineers in 
order to replace legitimate Chip & PIN terminals in 
unsuspecting shops [6] gangs recruiting members of staff 
in shops and petrol filling stations to replace Chip & PIN 
terminals [7] gangs building skimming devices which fit 
over the top of legitimate ATM machines. 
4.  CONTACTLESS PAYMENT TECHNOLOGY 
The introduction of any new payments technology 
potentially introduces new weaknesses for the criminals 
to exploit; contactless payments cards are no different in 
this respect. 
4.1  Exploitable Weakness 
The specific weakness exploited in this demonstration is 
that the contactless cards will divulge the (i) card number 
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(ii) cardholder name (iii) expiry date (iv) issue date, 
unencrypted to any NFC reader that requests the data. 
This is not an error, the functionality is fully compliant 
with the EMV specification for contactless cards. It is 
assumed that the maximum read range of 10cm makes it 
difficult to get close enough to read the card without 
arousing suspicion. This assumption is incorrect. 
5.  THE DEMONSTRATION 
The demonstration is a mock-up of a counter top on 
which a Chip & PIN terminal has been set up to accept 
legitimate payments from EMV cardholders. It replicates 
the design of counters found in many UK filling stations 
and shops, with a display area for sweets immediately 
adjacent to the Point Of Sale. 
 
 
Figure 1: Point Of Sale mock-up with EMV terminal 
5.1  Reading the Card Details 
A hidden NFC reader has been set up to capture the 
details of any contactless card which is inserted into the 
EMV Chip & PIN terminal. Data capture takes place 
before card is fully inserted into the terminal so it does 
not affect the legitimate Chip & PIN transition. 
5.2  Capturing the 3 Digit CVV 
The 3 digit CVV (Card Verification Value) printed on the 
back of the card is required to make telephone and/or 
online purchases. 
The demonstration captures the CVV using a hidden 
camera, this technique was selected as it is low cost, 
easy to implement and it is technology that the criminals 
are already using in their current attacks. 
5.3  High Value Return 
The aim of the attack is to capture the data required to 
purchase high value (easy to resell) items online. 
Many websites will allow the customer to specify a 
delivery address which is different from the cardholder 
address registered with the bank (gifts for friends and 
family), this allows the criminals to receive the stolen 
goods without raising suspicion. 
The £15 transaction limit which is designed to protect 
contactless cards does not apply as the data is being 
used to make online purchases. 
5.4  Low Cost and Easy Implementation 
The demonstration uses a £50 off-the-shelf NFC reader, 
and a £10 USB camera. All of the software used is either 
GNU licence or adapted from online source code 
examples, which are readily accessible to anyone. 
5.5  3D Secure Authentication 
The major credit card companies have implemented 3D 
Secure payment authentication for online transactions, 
which require an extra proof of identity not available from 
the card. This protects against skimming attacks such as 
the one identified in this paper.   
Unfortunately although 3D Secure technology provides 
excellent protection for online merchants, it offers only 
limited protection for cardholders whilst the technology is 
not universally implemented across all websites. 
6.  PROPOSED SOLUTION 
EMV contactless cards are passive in design; they can 
be read by any reader that comes within the 10cm range 
without the knowledge of the cardholder. 
It would be relatively easy to obviate this type of 
skimming attack, by designing active cards which will 
only communicate with a reader once the cardholder has 
intentionally activated the card. 
Card activation will be achieved by the application of 
pressure anywhere on the card, this should be possible 
whilst the card is still inside a wallet, thereby maintaining 
the convenience and speed of contactless payments. 
A piezoelectric material will be used to activate the card, 
removing the requirement for a battery and lowering the 
cost. A simple switch will isolate the EMV contactless 
chip from the antenna whilst the card is inactive and 
connects the chip to the antenna when the cardholder 
specifically activates the card. 
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